報告書番号

Y91004

タイトル（和文）

自家発保有需要家向け料金のゲーム論的分析

タイトル（英文）

GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVE RATES FOR CUSTOMERS WITH SELF-GENERATION

概要 （図表や脚注は「報告書全文」に掲載しております）

本報告では大口需要家の自家発シフトをくいとめ，かつ既存自家発の有効利用を図るため，自家発を保有する需要家向けの料金設定のあり方をゲーム論的に検討した。電気事業者が自家発需要家に売電可能量を提示して，これに対して自家発需要家が自家発電量を決定するものとし，前者は一般需要家の便益を含む社会全体の純便益を最大にするように，また後者は自己の便益を最大にするように行動するものとして，交渉価格（時間帯別料金の形をとる）を求めた。自家発の限界費用が電気事業の限界費用に近接にする場合など，両者が競合関係にあるときは，電気事業が自家発需要家に割引き料金を適用することは社会的にも（自家発を保有しない需要家にとっても）望ましいことを導出した。これは電力市場に本格的な競争が導入される場合には，競合相手の電力供給コストを陽表的に意識した料金設定が必要になることを示すものと言える。

概要 （英文）

ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION BY SELF-GENERATORS HAS BEEN GROWING MORE RAPIDLY THAN THAT OF LARGE INDUSTRIAL CUSTOMERS SINCE 1986 IN JAPAN. THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF A SPIRALING NUMBER OF CUSTOMER SHIFTS,COUPLED WITH A CORRESPONDING REALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS AMONG FEWER CUSTOMERS,COULD LEAVE ONLY CAPTIVE CUSTOMERS BEING SERVED BY UTILITIES,AND THESE CUSTOMERS COULD BE CALLED UPON TO PAY UNACCEPTABLY-HIGH RATES FOR ELECTRIC SERVICE. THIS STUDY USES A GAME THEORY APPROACH TO EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF SELF-GENERATION BY CUSTOMERS ON THE PRICING PROCESS WHEN A TIME-OF-USE (TOU) RATE IS APPLIED. THE TOU PRICING PROBLEM IS FORMULATED AS A COOPERATIVE GAME,A NASH GAME,AND A STACKELBERG GAME,RESPECTIVELY BETWEEN AN ELECTRIC UTILITY AND A SELF-GENERATOR. THE STACKELBERG GAME (THE ELECTRIC UTILITY AS A LEADER AND THE SELF-GENERATORAS A FOLLOWER) REFLECTS A REAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE EQUILIBRIUM IS EVALUATED AS DESIRABLE IN SOCIAL-WALFARE TERMS. THE WELFARE-MAXIMIZING PRICE FOR THE SELF-GENERATOR SHOULD BE LOWER THAN THAT FOR THE ORDINARY COUSTMER WHEN THE MARGINAL COST OF THE SELF-GENERATOR IS LOWER THAN THAT OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY. THEN,THE OPTIMAL PRICE FOR THE SELF-GENERATOR IS LINKED WITH THE MARGINAL COST OF SELF-GENERATION. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SELF-GENERATOR AND THE ELECTRIC UTILITY MAKES THE UTILITY REDUCETHE PRICES FOR CUSTOMERS WITH SELF-GENERATION,COMPARED WITH THE COOPERATIVE GAME.

報告者

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